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CHINA’S NEW GLOBALISM 
LIN CHUN 
he traditions of communist revolution and socialist internationalism, 
which once defined the People’s Republic of China, have today 
faded into the distant past. The programme of ‘reform and opening’ 
market integration that began in 1978, intensified especially since 1992, 
has now evolved into an all-round globalism that guides China’s domestic 
and foreign policies. Free trade is promulgated in a peculiar rhetoric of 
socialism that embraces a ‘common destiny for the human community’ 
along with a cooperative relationship between the ‘G2’. At the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th National Congress in October 2017, Xi 
Jinping declared that ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a 
new era’.  
What exactly is new and aspirational about this era? The ‘two 
centenary’ goals first proposed in the 15th Party Congress in 1997, and 
elaborated in the 18th Congress in 2012, remain in place: By 2021, the 
100-year anniversary of the founding of CCP, China will have built itself 
into a fully-fledged xiaokang (moderately prosperous) society by 
doubling its 2010 per capita income while eliminating poverty. By 2049, 
the 100-year anniversary of the founding of PRC, China will have 
become a ‘strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and modern 
socialist country’. How these lofty characterizations might be 
substantiated is a real question, as current policies do not seem oriented 
toward achieving them. 
What does appear unconventional is the ‘fifth generation’ leadership’s 
‘going out’ plan (apart from domestic escalation of repressive control). 
This marked the complete end of the Maoist internationalist and anti-
imperialist worldview, a process begun with Deng Xiaoping’s ineffective 
war to ‘teach Vietnam a lesson’ in 1979 to signal China’s proUS shift. 
Deng’s pragmatic strategy of keeping a ‘low profile’ in the next three 
decades has been replaced by Xi’s more assertive posture in pursuing the 
‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ and demanding a place at the 
center of the global stage: ‘Scientific socialism is full of vitality in 
twenty-first century China, and the banner of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics is now flying high and proud for all to see.’ Chinese 
approaches to solving the problems facing mankind, from conflicts to 
eco-crises, were declared here to be globally applicable.  
T 
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This global optimism in the name of its own brand of socialism, 
however, contradicted China’s subordination to the logic of capitalism at 
home and abroad, and may now be tested by an aggressive US trade war. 
Xi’s speech at the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2018 struck a much less 
confident and more conciliatory tone. Stressing that countries should stay 
committed to openness and mutual benefits, he reconfirmed China’s 
commitment to more comprehensive economic liberalization, including 
relaxing controls on the financial sector. China would ‘significantly 
expand market access’ by: immediately (or soon) stepping up imports, 
further opening its financial market and service industries, raising foreign 
equity limits in securities, insurers and banks, lowering auto tariffs, easing 
restrictions on foreign ownership in manufacturing (e.g. ships, aircraft 
and autos), and enforcing intellectual property rights. Here the contrast 
between China’s economic vulnerability and foreign policy boldness, as 
between autocratic political control and neoliberal-style economic 
policies, is uniquely striking, even as China apparently remains 
determined to stick to its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as well 
as its pledge to be a ‘responsible big country’.  
This essay, after a brief background account of China’s departure from 
socialist internationalism and global repositioning, will critically assess 
the dominant official ideological justifications for globalism in China. 
Along the way, three propositions are advanced. First, China’s partially 
dependent development since undertaking market reforms is 
unsustainable and cannot be emulated by others. Second, China must 
address its own serious problems before it can offer the world anything 
morally appealing or practically feasible: the success of China’s overland 
and overseas adventures will depend on the creation of a humanly and 
environmentally sound domestic social model. Third, China’s outward 
quest for energy and other resources comes with serious perils amidst the 
realpolitik of American hegemony and militarism. It is in this context that 
the essay concludes by asking whether China can reasonably be expected 
to regain the ability to positively reshape the global political economy. 
FAREWELL TO THIRD WORLD INTERNATIONALISM 
Revolutionary China’s socialist internationalism had two dimensions: 
defending national sovereignty based on internal ethnic equality and 
solidarity, and externally supporting other countries in the socialist and 
third world camps.  The new China of the 1950s saw the modern world in 
terms of overcoming the challenge of uneven capitalist development, in 
which a ‘privilege of backwardness’ could enable a country at the margin 
to catch up or even surpass the centre through learning and leaping. Such 
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ascendance was seen to be conditional on the subjugated peoples breaking 
free from imperialist chains, that is, from the capitalist extraction, 
domination, and sabotage which not only hampered independent 
development, but entailed profound and anguishing disadvantages 
associated with economic backwardness.  
Despite its relatively advanced status before 1800, the Chinese 
experience of semi-coloniality, whereby the collusion between foreign 
powers and a local comprador-bureaucracy achieved no imitation of the 
West but only prevented any substantive attempt at modernization.  The 
lessons the Communists drew from this explains the dual character – both 
nationalist and socialist – of the revolution of 1949. Oriented to 
fashioning an independent developmental state wherein revolutionary 
nationalism and third-worldist internationalism were dual markers of 
Maoist foreign policy. The victorious revolution in China was never 
merely Chinese in the postwar realignment of global politics. Nationalism 
was a form of internationalist identification with other oppressed peoples 
in a twofold commitment to national liberation. Chinese nationalism was 
also tied to socialism which was intrinsically internationalist.  
This internationalism confronted a global capitalist system, in which 
the independent survival of any socialist regime would depend on the 
sustenance it could draw from wider resistance to that system. Despite its 
own acute difficulties, China thus aided anti-colonial movements and 
postcolonial developments beyond its borders, often in the complicated 
circumstances of an international united front replete with internal 
tensions. China’s assistance to its socialist neighbours and communist 
guerrillas in Southeast Asia, support for nationalists and socialists in the 
Arab world, and solidarity with civil rights and black liberation 
movements in America and Africa were all predicated on its own security 
as well as its internationalist duties. The third world, in Mao’s map, 
constituted a broad area of popular struggles that challenged what he 
increasingly came to characterize as two hostile camps dominated by the 
competing super powers. Proudly self-reliant, China was able to create 
precious autonomy and diplomatic room for manoeuvre in an extremely 
treacherous geopolitical context. On an anti-imperialist platform – Soviet 
‘social imperialism’ included – Maoist internationalism embraced the 
nonaligned nations that had initially rallied together at the 1955 Bandung 
conference, as well as the rebellious and antiwar generation of 1968 in the 
West. This anti-hegemonic stance was asserted with no little panache 
against the narrow logic of the Cold War adversaries, although the 
rigidity of China’s opposition to the Soviet Union resulted in serious 
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errors, with some damaging effects not only on the Communist bloc but 
also the developing world. 
Socialism, third-worldism and internationalism were, at the most basic 
level, natural allies. Based on the ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’ 
earlier codified between China and India in their agreement concerning 
trade and communication in the Tibetan region, the Bandung Conference 
adopted ‘ten principles’ of national independence and integrity, equality 
of all races and nations, and noninterference in international affairs. Later 
the nonaligned movement (NAM), initiated by Yugoslavia, India, and 
Egypt, became an important political force, especially once it entered a 
more radical phase following the 1959 Cuban revolution, which led to the 
participation from Latin America.  
Indeed, China was highly visible among progressives throughout the 
three continents, spanning its support for struggles ranging from 
Congolese independence and the Algerian revolution to the Chinese-
designed and financed TAZARA, the single longest railway in sub-
Saharan Africa, connecting Tanzania and Zambia and completed in the 
early 1970s. Indeed, China maintained a large aid programme and 
friendly diplomacy with third world countries, offering grants, interest 
free loans, and direct building, training and service projects that involved 
technology transfer, especially in agriculture. China’s international 
conduct was exemplary of an alternative practice to the prevailing first-
third world relationship.  
In 1964, after China’s relations with the Soviet bloc (and India 
following the 1962 border war) had gone sour, Mao did not miss the 
occasion to support anti-US protest in Panama in calling for the ‘broadest 
united front’ to ‘counter American imperialist aggression and war policies 
and defend world peace’.1 Without getting into the Sino-Soviet debate 
over fundamental theoretical questions or relationships among the 
communist parties, suffice it here to note that in the more militant Chinese 
view, ‘revisionist’ Soviet policies amounted to a betrayal of Marxism and 
world revolution. Overlooked was the very existence of a USSR 
constraining the Atlantic powers, and thus functioning as a brake on 
capitalist war and money machines – something that could be truly 
appreciated only after the fact. It was in this sense that Eric Hobsbawm 
described the collapse of the Soviet Union as ‘an unmitigated 
catastrophe’.2 In other words, China’s preoccupation with counter-
hegemony led to a categorical misjudgment, similar to the error in 
domestic politics of confusing the ‘two kinds of contradictions’ (as Mao 
put it in 1957) by mistaking ‘contradictions among the people’ for those 
between enemies. This form of ‘left infantilism’ eventually trapped China 
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in impossible isolation. To relieve itself, and counterbalance the Soviet 
threat,3 China turned to the US after having rebuffed American entreaties 
in 1968-9 when the war in Vietnam heavily involved Chinese weapons 
and undercover field troops. The shift from waging a united struggle 
against global capitalism to an anti-hegemonic alliance poisoned by 
sectarianism or from socialist to nationalist principles, compromised the 
class nature of the third-worldist version of proletarian internationalism.  
Consequently, the impact of China’s foreign policy and international 
relations involuntarily became mixed, if not outright detrimental, in 
relation to the internationalist cause.4 Communist infighting spread from 
the SinoSoviet split, fracturing parties everywhere and resulting in ‘an 
ever more accelerated disintegration of the internationalism of the 
classical communist movement’, with the exception of Cuba as an icon of 
internationalism.  
The nationalist impulse, however, was an almost inevitable response to 
capitalist crusades against communist regimes since 1917, as exemplified 
by the contrast in Asia between the blockading of communist states and 
the nurturing of anti-communist ones, which have enjoyed extravagant 
aid and market access from the US and Japan. Problems associated with 
internal bureaucratization of the Eastern bloc were somewhat curbed by 
the wars in Ho Chi Minh’s Vietnam, redressed in Mao’s experiments in 
China, and fairly kept at bay in Cuba. Yet in addition to the centralization, 
and often personalization, of power that subverted revolutions, conflicts 
among comrades and allies demoralized and exhausted both the socialist 
and third worlds. Internationalism, socialism, and third-worldism went 
down together.  
In the aftermath of the breakdown of Bretton Woods and the oil crisis 
and abandonment of the gold standard, as the developing countries found 
themselves even more deeply dependent economically, the 1970s 
witnessed the gradual transformation of the ‘third world’ from a 
politically transformative agent to merely a developing economic 
enterprise. This was marked by the formation of the G77, which was 
confined to a growth agenda implemented under the monopoly of the G7, 
the IMF and the World Bank. China showed growing ambivalence toward 
the NAM due to its own enmity towards the USSR, signing a reversion of 
its third-worldism. The responsibility of China for the passing of an age 
of raging popular mobilization for global equality and justice is especially 
regrettable because China itself belonged to the third world. Its traverse, 
from being fiercely independent to opportunistically leaning toward the 
US, followed the same Cold War logic of détente originated in the Yalta 
deal – that of a ‘balance of terror’.   
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An important clarification is in order. If revolutionary China’s 
rapprochement with the US through Mao’s tactical acceptance of the 
American olive branch in the early 1970s was still a conditional strategic 
move, reformist China was subsequently fully willing to play the rules of 
capitalist domination. The Maoist endeavour was to weaken a bipolar 
world order and strengthen China’s defence and economy by pitting the 
two superpowers against each other. By contrast, a globalizing China has 
today largely abandoned anti-imperialism in joining a unipolar world. 
Obvious continuities notwithstanding, the two eras represent different 
Chinese identities: between socialism and ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’; between internationalism of class/national liberation and 
globalism of jiegui or ‘getting on the track’; between independence and 
subordination; and indeed between revolution and counter-revolution. If 
Mao momentarily deviated from socialist and internationalist propositions, 
he and his colleagues retained them in their long-term principles. His 
successors, on the other hand, became cynical about socialism altogether 
and simply removed ‘internationalism’ from the official vocabulary. This 
great transformation was of momentous significance: by fuelling global 
capitalism with its enormous workforce and vast market for capitalist 
expansion and financialization, China actually helped extend and sustain 
the global capitalist system.5  
CHINA’S GLOBAL INTEGRATION 2.0 
China’s turning itself into a ‘rule taker’ and capitalist growth centre not 
only meant providing capitalism and its global division of labour with a 
vast new space of exploitation and reconfiguration. Politically, it also 
meant that the world’s most populous state became no longer identified 
with the loosely rallied anti-capitalist left of the world. While ecologically, 
it led to the largest developing country, albeit one producing goods 
primarily consumed abroad, to overtake the developed economies in 
pollutant emissions and resource depletion. But above all, market reforms 
in China, in tandem with global neoliberalism, deeply transformed 
Chinese culture along with its class, gender, ethnic and regional relations. 
The nominally communist regime has sponsored what is depicted inside 
China as a partial bureaucratic-capitalist restoration, which continuously 
inflicts calamities upon society and nature. This is a polarizing process. It 
has evidently reduced absolute poverty while reproducing it in other ways 
due to the marketization of public services and creating a degree of 
consumerist homogeneity amidst all kinds of social disparities. Ten of 
millions children ‘left behind’ by their parents work as rural migrants in 
faraway cities, often in precarious, low wage jobs allowing only the most 
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meagre of living conditions – this alone tells the inhumanity of China’s 
‘economic miracle’.  
If China’s globalism 1.0 was a project of reform and opening intended 
to utilize foreign capital, managerial skills, and technologies to build an 
advanced sovereign national economy, that ‘shallow’, selective and self-
protective ‘relinking’ has long been outdone by a more thorough 
integration. Continuing the trend, globalism 2.0 is premised on Shengai 
(‘deepening the reform’), thereby pointing to China’s comprehensive 
global participation. The agenda is unprecedented: privatizing state firms 
and commodifying the land, loosening financial regulation for foreign 
investors, and liberalizing the ‘commanding heights’ of national 
industries.  
Xi’s latest interpretation of the Communist Manifesto serves as ironic 
ideological packaging for this agenda. In a Political Bureau study session 
on 23 April 2018, he applied Marx’s characterization of a rising 
capitalism conquering the globe in claiming that China must strive to 
‘multi-polarize the world, globalize its economy, informationize its 
society, and pluralize its culture’ so as to allow the benefits and 
opportunities brought about by globalization to be better shared. Bearing 
Xi’s personal name, this upgraded globalism demands unreserved consent 
from not only party officials, but also common citizens. Any critical voice 
is stifled.  
A fundamental reversal of Maoist self-reliance, globalism 2.0 
resembles elements of the earlier cases of dependent development yet is 
also unconventional. It has two interrelated defining features. One is a 
considerable degree of dependence on foreign capital, markets and 
technology as a result of unequal exchange, and inadequate economic 
self-protection; the other is capital exportation as a result of overcapacity 
and the quest for energy, as well as by virtue of excessive foreign reserve 
holdings and capital flight through individual transfers of funds abroad by 
the new rich.6 The first, entailing heavy labour exploitation, resource 
extraction, and environmental degradation, is more or less within the 
analytical scope of dependency theory. The second dimension is less 
anticipated, as it entails a peripheral economy competing with the core 
economies in the capitalist concentration and financialization.   
The first feature of China’s new globalism is the amplification of its 
flawed reform model. Attempts to change it have not succeeded. It was 
quite unexpected by the initial reformers that, in comparison with the 
typical East Asian developmental states, foreign dependency has been 
reinforced rather than phased out as the Chinese economy has grown 
exponentially. Not without large gains, of which some are short-term, this 
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trajectory has proven very costly. As top companies in most industrial 
sectors in China are already infused with foreign capital and control,7 a 
trend only reinforced by the current policy of further opening, the initial 
hope to ‘exchange market access for technologies’ is being dashed. In the 
same vein, nothing seems able to halt the inroads made by multinationals 
seeking super-profits and rents, some are also moving away from China 
to seek still cheaper labour.  
This pattern emerged as a result of extraordinarily preferential policies 
toward foreign investors: reductions to, or even exemption from, regular 
taxation applied to Chinese firms in various periods and forms; and the 
double failure of Chinese regulators to enforce conditions on foreign 
investment for technological transfer and diffusion, on one hand, and to 
rein in ‘casino capitalism’ and prevent investor short-termism, on the 
other. If such policies were rationalized at a time of China’s capital 
shortage, their reinforcement today is hardly justifiable, not only 
politically but also economically. This is all the more puzzling given that 
the government has repeatedly pledged to ‘rebalance’ and move China up 
the value chain. Since Hu Jintao’s ‘scientific conception of development’ 
proposed in 2006 and emphasizing innovation, China has focused on its 
large state firms for technological capacity building while leaving smaller 
enterprises in the export sector to sustain a trade surplus.  
In 2015, the national ‘Made in China 2025’ agenda promoted R&D in 
ten strategic industries to develop a knowledge economy equipped with 
mostly Chinese-made components. But the current deficit in sovereign 
determination and control over the Chinese economy risks sabotaging 
these efforts.  The importance of China becoming technologically 
independent is mirrored in current US trade blockages, ranging from 
Section 301 tariffs to threatening a wholesale trade war (the first 
announced in June 2018 with tariffs on some 1300 Chinese goods valued 
at about $50 billion for US imports, and a second list valued at about 
$100 billion being prepared).8 In April, the US Department of Commerce 
suspended the supply of key chips to China’s leading telecom company, 
Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation (ZTE), instantly 
paralyzing the company’s operation (before rescinding them shortly after 
under new US supervision of its activities). Another tech giant, Huawei, 
has also faced limits on its exports to the US (and several US ally states as 
well). In response, the Chinese government announced in June ‘special 
opening-up measures’ to further widen market access for foreign 
investment in twenty-two key fields including finance, transportation, 
services, infrastructure, energy, resources, and agriculture.9 
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As events unfold, questions will be raised about just how much 
leverage China has. The one certain thing is that reliance on foreign 
supply and markets undermines national self-determination, as well as 
financial and cyber-security in an age of global standardization. 
Washington’s policing deals with China to protect American advantage 
alone negates the myth of ‘free trade’ that the Chinese state holds dear. 
Shocking inequalities in liberalization are demonstrated by massive 
agricultural subsidies in the West, and the blocking of Chinese FDI in the 
US and Europe.  
All this is in spite of the major concessions China has made through its 
marketization of its state sector, both for WTO accession as well as 
currently in the form of its trade surplus (of which a huge trunk is 
attributable to foreign and joint ventures). The contrast between Apple’s 
astronomical profits and its Chinese subcontractors’ thin margins is 
notorious, not to mention the miserable conditions faced by Chinese 
workers assembling iPhones. Multinationals producing in China for the 
world market (while factored into Chinese GDP) also weaken China’s 
fiscal and monetary tools, which are already constrained by dollar 
primacy and attendant capital liquidity requirements. Although barely at a 
middle income level in comparison to other states, it is exceptional that 
China has become a net exporter of assets and wealth. While it will surely 
not return to the bad old days of its semicolonialism as some worry, 
China is indeed the only large economy that has permitted its sovereignty 
and security to be so seriously compromised. Introducing foreign 
‘strategic partners’ into Chinese state banks with large shares as well as 
voting rights, for example, is an astonishing cession of control to foreign 
capital – capital which at times is even formally connected to foreign 
governments.   
The second feature of the new Chinese globalism (though developed 
from such projects as ‘developing the west’ and ‘going out’ since the late 
1990s) is more novel, and decorated with both nationalist and 
transnational or cosmopolitan slogans like ‘national rejuvenation’ and 
‘common human destiny’. The mega-idea of the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), first announced in 2012, is to create new economic corridors and 
networks linking over 70 countries, 70 per cent of the world’s population, 
and three quarters of known global energy reserves, by constructing 
highways, railroads, mines, pipelines, dams, ports and trading routes, 
using the image of ancient Silk Road by land and sea. Eurasian 
integration is extended to the Caucasus and Western Europe, while the 
maritime side of the BRI is to embrace the Indian Ocean and the Mekong 
and Oceanic nations, as well as Africa and Latin America. It aims to 
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export capital, commodities and entrepreneurship as well as broader 
social goods like schools, medical facilities, poverty alleviation 
programmes, and agricultural cooperation. As a state priority of both 
economic and political-diplomatic importance, the newly-founded Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the China Development Bank, 
and other institutions support the BRI financially. And by pursuing ‘intra-
regional local currency convertibility’ – making the Renminbi a common 
hard currency, beginning in Central Asia – the BRI also hopes to be a 
financial project that can pave the way for China to gain a footing under 
the dollar monopoly, while simultaneously yielding more influence on 
major international organizations. 
But it was the economic imperative of channelling China’s excess 
capital and overcapacity that immediately explained the launch of BRI. 
The massive stimulus undertaken to protect growth and employment 
following the 2008 financial crisis triggered by the US subprime 
meltdown has had lasting consequences. Debt-financed overinvestment in 
the built environment and ‘forced urbanization’ on an unparalleled scale 
are explosive: ‘The Chinese who have absorbed and then created an 
increasing mass of surplus capital now desperately seek a spatial fix.’10 
The BRI, then, is an ideal representation of China’s position in a global 
economic structure in which any upward movement faces a contradiction 
between overaccumulation and underconsumption. As such, the Chinese 
project of investing abroad is both an economic necessity that stems from 
capital’s expansive tendencies as it searches for new resources and 
markets, as well as a politically and culturally inspired ambition to 
promote ‘globality, connectivity, equality, sharing and commonality’. 
A SOCIALIST VISION OF GLOBAL EQUALITY? 
Remarkably, the official discourse of BRI bears no trace of the 
internationalist legacy of the earlier socialist third-worldist tradition. A 
representative summary indicates five strategic changes in Chinese 
growth that follow from the conviction that development is enabled by the 
opening up of national economies for global integration by moving from: 
1) a focus on foreign capital to a dual emphasis on both the inflows and 
outflows of FDI; 2) an export-orientation to encouraging growth in the 
volume of trade from both exports and imports; 3) opening the coastal 
areas to the coordinated incorporation of the inland regions as well; 4) 
trading within the WTO framework to more bilateral and multilateral 
FTAs; and 5) a ‘rule taker’ in relation to global governance to active 
participation in ‘rule making’.11 The BRI project, with its lavish 
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elaborations by mainstream intellectuals and inflected with a nationalist 
appeal to a youthful middle class, enjoys solid support in China.  
Even more critical socialist arguments tend to be, at once, both 
defensive and wishful. Lured by such notions as growth for all, equal 
partnership, and shared prosperity and security, critics imagine aligning 
the BRI with local needs and designs across the globe through ‘people-to-
people interactions’.  
This would, apparently, nurture trust and peace as well as cooperation and 
interdependence, while enabling China to play a leadership role in 
pushing for a new world order. The key concept in this imaginary is a 
globalizing equality right to be applied to both domestic and international 
relations. The politics of equality, born of the Chinese revolution and its 
internationalist commitments, is what distinguishes the BRI from familiar 
stories of oppression, exploitation, and war-prone power rivalries. As an 
alternative to the capitalist world system of polarizing inequality among 
nations, a rising China with a global vision would lead a new politics of 
equality – equality in difference, equal recognition of diversities, and 
socialist egalitarianism with an international dimension. Most 
optimistically, uninfected by imperialist and colonialist intention and 
methods, China would counter the US-Japan maritime dominance in the 
region while reshaping the entire global system of unequal north-south 
divide.12 The significance of the BRI, on this interpretation of it, is not 
only material but also broadly political and spiritual: ‘It must not be a 
plan of territorial expansion but one of connectivity, exchange and 
communication, and a plan of transcending historical capitalism while 
recreating civilization.’13 
Another argument in a similar vein asserts that China has an advantage 
in the ‘real economy’, as opposed to speculative financialized capitalism, 
despite its own credit and asset bubbles. By defying financial imperialism 
‘the most unnatural stage of decayed capitalism’, China can stimulate an 
international united front to fight the dominance of financial capital and 
its local comprador financiers.14 Since, according to this view, the 
expansion of the BRI is neither profit-driven, nor a contemporary version 
of the Marshall Plan, it can pursue productive socialization by means of 
automation, digitalization, and financial cooperation.15 The AIIB is put 
forward as China’s first attempt to form a post-Bretton Woods framework 
through which the international allocation of funds may serve both market 
and non-market considerations, resulting in peaceful co-development.  
While Chinese lending involving both state and private commercial 
banks (currently at a low annual interest rate of 2-3 per cent for 15-20 
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years, including a grace period of five to seven years) entails foreign 
liabilities, at least the state lenders also conduct periodic evaluations to 
reduce or even cancel debts. Moreover, China rarely imposes IMF-type of 
conditionalities on borrowers. Equally true, however, is that ‘when 
providing loans and finance, the AIIB must remain flexible regarding 
labor and environmental standards’ in order to remain compatible with 
‘the limited financial capacity of less affluent countries’. China is also 
strongly against adding labour protections into bilateral trade 
agreements.16  
The ‘Chinese alternative’ would also be hard-pressed to identify any 
pillars of a socialist circle of commerce operational in an overridingly 
capitalist global order. From its own collective memory, China knows 
only too well the catastrophe of colonialism, and just how impossible it is 
for the poorer countries to achieve the ‘surplus retention’ necessary for 
development. Moreover, unbridled business, clutching resources and 
making money, attract state as well as private capital, with inadequate 
public supervision at both dispensing and receiving ends.  
Conspicuously absent from these sympathetic explanations is a class 
analysis of the Chinese state and its projected foreign relations. What is 
the class content of the BRI? Is it in the fundamental interest of the rulers 
and elites, Chinese and otherwise, or of the labouring and common people 
– unless it can be argued that these interests are broadly identical? 
Without a political and conceptual justification for the project in class 
terms, it is also difficult to refute the charge of China’s own ‘neo-’ or 
‘sub-’imperialism, which, from a Marxist perspective, is intrinsic to 
accumulation and capitalization in a globalizing economy. At stake is 
regime legitimacy in uncharted waters; ultimately, the question of 
whether China can refashion globalization on its own terms cannot be 
answered without an answer to the prior question of what kind of society 
China is building for itself in the first place. Without a morally appealing 
domestic model, as the foundation for so-called soft power, any image 
China offers to the world will be tarnished.17  
This is precisely where the country’s vulnerability emerges. Side-by-
side with its immense economic achievements, its radicalized market 
transition has borne witness to severe social inequalities, environmental 
destruction, rampant corruption, and an ever more repressive atmosphere 
for the constitutionally protected rights of labour, ethnic minorities, and 
political dissidents left and right alike. As the super-rich and bureaucratic 
tycoons sit in the National People’s Congress, and anti-corruption 
campaigns end up strengthening autocratic power, socialism sounds 
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hollow inside and outside China. The fact that ‘maintaining stability’ 
takes the largest slice of Chinese national spending speaks for itself.18 
CONFUCIAN UNIVERSALISM GOES GLOBAL? 
A highly influential traditionalist interpretation of China’s new globalism 
relies on an idealized Confucian conception of tianxia, or ‘all under 
heaven’. Unlike the conventional culturalist sinological conservatism that 
simply overturns communist negation of traditional Chinese values, the 
tianxia discourse is politically conscious while simultaneously crafting a 
depoliticized language of universal harmony. It presents an ethnically and 
religiously insensitive cosmology of a grand amalgamation of races and 
cultures – within fluid identities and frontiers, without stable or definable 
boundaries. The constant internalization of the external results in a 
boundless realm of wuwai: literally, ‘nobody/nothing being outside’. 
‘Inventing world politics’ anew, tianxia in the contemporary era signifies 
a globalist worldview that understands human society all inclusively, and 
is thus at odds with the anachronistic Westphalian nation-state system. It 
also confirms the normative ideal of moral rule by the ‘mandate of 
heaven’, underscoring the ancient wisdom of equal sharing of land/wealth, 
and the ‘people as the foundation’ of government (Mencius).  
As an ‘ontology of coexistence’ and a worldview of ‘compatible 
universalism’, tianxia is claimed to have transcended the Kantian doctrine 
of perpetual peace.19 This blending of an old harmonious imaginary with a 
new blueprint for a silk road makes it impossible to repeat colonial 
conquests and exploitation. A unique spatial politics, this is couched in an 
apolitical narrative of ‘civilization’ and ‘empire without imperialism’ as a 
cure for the immorality of global ills. The renewal of a splendid pre-
modern system can catalyze a groundbreaking reformation that transcends 
the capitalist and imperialist logic of nation states. China in the twenty-
first century, carrying the residues of its former self – as an empire, or 
civilization, or in any case a worldly entity – might well ‘slip loose’ of its 
boundaries once again, all for a good cause.20  
As traditionalism is inflected to serve a legitimizing function, China’s 
new globalism is at pains to appear as an attractive path to enhancing 
southsouth cooperation and equality among nations in a non- or post-
capitalist fashion.21 But this is a fantasy. For one thing, it was repressive 
hierarchy rather than equality that characterized the Confucian social 
norms as well as the Sino-centric regional order. Equality existed only in 
the demands of peasant uprisings and utopian social thinking. For another, 
the claim that the ‘civilizational state’ was non-hegemonic is questionable, 
not only because imperial territories had doubled under the Qing rule, but 
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more subtly because of Han domination. Even minority dynasties 
protected their own elites, while pursuing reverse assimilation toward the 
majority. It was not until the communist revolution that the issue of ethnic 
inequality was directly addressed through a socialist ideological and 
institutional reorganization.  
Historically, the Chinese ‘pacified empire’, in Max Weber’s depiction, 
rarely engaged in military aggression perhaps due to an inward-looking 
worldview and agrarian-based physiography. By and large, ‘in sharp 
contrast to the European powers and their colonial-settler descendants, 
China did not seek to construct an overseas empire’.22 But neither was 
historical ‘China’ ever singularly intelligible without floating frontiers, as 
it continued to absorb new territories and vassals. This inheritance of the 
modern zhonghua minzu or Chinese nation could be as much a blessing as 
a curse. If once categorically distinguishable from the capitalist colonial 
powers, it is no longer obvious that Chinese capital abroad today is not 
primarily motivated by profit and resources, or is a convenient diversion 
from domestic discontent.  
China’s ‘farewell to revolution’ and its international repositioning to 
court the US constitute an intertwined political logic. Domestically, ethnic 
tensions have sharpened with invading market forces, which have 
changed local demographic composition and eroded minority cultures. 
External agitation and state oppression make things worse. Globally, as 
the third world is replaced with ‘emerging markets’, the aspiration of 
rectifying an unjust world system has vanished. The fact that 
revolutionary China’s double mission of overthrowing foreign domination 
as well as Han chauvinism at home has now indefinitely halted also 
indicates the failure of tianxia-ism, or Chinese universalism, as a rival to 
realist theories of international relations. This is not so much because 
nations and their unequal or conflicting relationships are formidable 
realities as because nationalism and inclusive universalism are acutely 
different normative frames. However unwillingly, the image of Pax 
Sinica is tainted by the impossible thesis of a ‘clash of civilizations’.23 
Furthermore, Confucian universalism, as ‘the art of co-existing through 
transforming hostility into hospitality’,24 is toothless when facing a global 
order sustained by a powerful capitalist industrial-financial-military 
complex. The most glaring weakness of traditionalist theories, then, are 
their neglect of the state and the unavoidable need to win sovereign, 
autonomous, and democratic popular power across the developing (and 
indeed developed) world. Capturing state power is a prerequisite for 
achieving significant progressive goals at the global level.  
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From a modern socialist point of view, Confucianism, however 
modernized, is pre-socialist (and non- rather than necessarily 
precapitalist). Its conservative teachings, from belittling women to 
endorsing gentry-scholar elitism and undemocratic hierarchies, render it 
hopelessly reactionary and obsolete. Its most radical element – the moral 
right and legitimacy of rebellion against tyranny – is convincingly 
suppressed in its official promotion of a ruling ideology. Sophisticated 
and eloquent though it may be, the philosophy of a uniformly benevolent, 
ascendant, globalizing Chinese tradition cannot rival either liberal or 
realist theories of great power politics, which also extend into the public 
sphere and mass media. Nothing less than the practical renewal of 
socialist internationalism presents a real alternative. To be sure, 
traditional culture comprising a rich array of intellectual resources can be 
re-appropriated, from the nature-friendly idea of unity between heaven 
and people and ‘methodological relationism’ over individualism to the 
wisdom of economic management, market regulation, and disaster relief. 
But it is the ‘revolutionary break with the past’ that has defined China 
since 1949, completely recasting its internal and external relations. In this 
light, Confucian revivalism signals a politics of defeat and escapism. The 
bizarre scene of party secretaries kneeling to a statue of Confucius in an 
ancestral temple or an educational campus indicates a political crisis. It is 
a sign of ideological bankruptcy that official China should have found it 
necessary to appeal to an ancient saint. 
LOST IN ACCUMULATION: CRISES AND ILLUSIONS 
Neither a socialist reinterpretation of China’s new globalism as heralding 
a monumental shift in global capitalism, nor a neo-Confucian 
universalism envisioned to be reordering international relations, can 
overcome the contradictions in China’s current position: China is 
simultaneously a beneficiary and victim of market transition, exploited by 
foreign capital and multinationals while arguably also engaged in 
exploitative relations with even more peripheral states; suffering 
dependency on foreign markets and technologies while also exporting 
capital and labour; disciplined by global powers yet possessed of a rising 
economic and diplomatic influence that is seen as a threat by competitors 
and neighbours; and espousing a nationalist discourse that champions 
globalization and free trade. The contrast between its socialist rhetoric 
and substantially neoliberal-style policies is also striking – especially 
given that the latter includes a pro-management labour regime, and gross 
inequalities in basic public provision and social services.   
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These two romantic approaches share an additional fundamental flaw. 
They leave the developmentalist core of Chinese globalism intact, at least 
concerning its sustainability in terms of its resource-environmental, 
financial, and foreign relations implications. It is only too easy to liken 
China with the old colonizers.25 However, as the world’s largest importer 
of a variety of essential commodities, China is indeed in the game of a 
global scramble for resources, from minerals to land and water. This, in 
turn, increases carbon emissions and pollution, worsening climate change 
and other ecological problems. It is dubious that the BRI can be 
environmentally conscious as geography and geology are being altered. 
Joining other global buyers, Chinese demand affects price and stock 
volatilities in both global and national markets. China’s macro financial 
system also suffers a debt problem at both the central and local levels, 
although only in its own currency. The same pattern is repeated by a 
‘cheque-book diplomacy’ that risks repayment crises and bankruptcies. 
More generally, the dystopia of GDP growth-at-all-costs, ‘creative 
destruction’ of organic communities and the eco-world, and the 
predictable panorama of bubble bursting and bank runs are neither 
morally sound nor practically viable.26  
The constant need for new spaces to accommodate endless 
accumulation is also geopolitically perilous. The scope and manner of 
China’s global adventures is a central question of realpolitik. For capital 
to source profits and rents globally, as it proceeds with its concentration, 
centralization, monopolization, and financialization, it needs to be backed 
by military strength. The existing world system cannot tolerate another 
growing economy of China’s size, or the emergence of new global 
powers. The imperialist law of value requires technological monopoly 
and protection of a rentier oligarchy.27 Since the BRI is packaged in 
liberal ideology, its silky discourse may superficially minimize certain 
political sensitivities, but it cannot eliminate them.  
Despite China’s devotion to market globalization in line with the 
capitalist world order, for those who retain a perpetual cold war mentality, 
any prospect of a ‘communist’ China becoming a financially and 
technologically independent economy is anathema. Yet even merely 
ensuring its supply of energy appears unrealistic without some Sino-US 
parity in geopolitical capacities, as more than half of Chinese imports and 
exports pass through straits and waterways that are within reach of the US 
Navy (and that the West has controlled for centuries). Under the 
Pentagon’s strategic encirclement of China, the economic and security 
objectives of China disturb the Americansecured regional balance. 
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Tensions have risen in the Himalayas, the East and South China Seas, and 
other more distant places. The Chinese geo-strategic notions of a ‘String 
of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and the ‘Nine-Dash Line’ in the South 
China Sea are fiercely contested. So far the Chinese objectives of 
‘strategic mutual trust’ and ‘win-win cooperation’ remain elusive. 
Instead of believing in its destined ‘marriage’ to the US, as declared by 
more than one government minister in Beijing, China should break free of 
American containment by guarding its hard-won independence. 
Expanding investments overseas, it needs to reinstate its founding 
principles of egalitarianism and democracy as the basis for any foreign 
policy. If Chinese economic and financial foundations lack the ability to 
fend off turmoil in global markets; if basic needs are still unfulfilled in 
national food sovereignty and securely funded public services for all; and 
if the poor, migrants, and certain minority groups are deprived of full 
citizenship and welfare rights; then are there not less wasteful and less 
risky forms of development that should be pursued instead of investing 
massively abroad? Operating globally may also escalate a vicious race to 
the bottom in addition to depleting resources, draining reserves, piling up 
debts, and spreading pollution through both production and consumption.  
The point is that China doesn’t need growth at such costs, especially 
when facing immense tasks at home – from resolving tech-bottlenecks to 
advancing toward its pledged ‘ecological civilization’. Greener industries 
can, in turn, assist agricultural productivity on the basis of collective land 
ownership and cooperative family farming. A new type of moral economy 
of rural and urban commons would aim at production for need rather than 
profit through a socialized market. This path would be both more 
ambitious and more realistic, if only because in the whole background is 
the incurable disease, historical impossibility, and structural inability of 
capitalism to provide for the vast majority of the world’s population.28 
The colossal destruction entailed by plundering land and people through 
the system of endless accumulation and crisis forces on us, more urgently 
than ever before, a non-choice as sharp as ‘socialism or barbarism’.   
This is by no means to repudiate internationalism. On the contrary, the 
argument is that without a domestic class power oriented toward 
socialism, no global vision or foreign policy can be truly internationalist. 
Reorientation within China is required before it can reshape globalization 
as an alternative to, rather than enhancement of, the capitalist global 
system. Any socially and internationally credible project here must also 
be part of an international front of popular struggle. The question would 
then be how China might forge a new path to reconstruct the global 
economy by organizing a scheme to aid national development and 
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transform socioeconomic conditions in the global south in particular, 
while heeding the warning against forming a ‘subimperialism’.  
In the most robust attempts to blend socialist and tianxia-ist ideas for 
China’s new globalism, the premise is the ‘unity of three traditions’ – 
classical Confucianism, Maoist socialism and Dengist market 
pragmatism.29 This is a straightforward narrative of China ‘standing up’ 
under Mao, ‘getting rich’ under Deng, and ‘becoming powerful’ under Xi. 
The confidence in offering the world a ‘Chinese solution’ and ‘Chinese 
wisdom’, as supporters see it, has a great deal to do with the depth of 
China’s cultural tradition. In one blatant formulation, Xi’s new era is ‘not 
adding Chinese characteristics to an already defined “socialist framework.” 
Rather, it uses China’s lived experience to explore and define what, in the 
final analysis, “socialism” is.’ And this definition is to be ‘universally 
recognized throughout the entire world’.30 Indeed the Chinese outlook has 
always been worldly and universalist, as shown in historical East Asia 
where ‘the tianxia order and the tribute system made up a universal 
system of diversity within unity, capable of absorbing different peoples, 
cultures and religious beliefs’. To expand such a Chinese civilization is 
‘the greatest historical mission of the Chinese people in the Xi Jinping 
era’.31  
In another interpretation based on a more profound analysis of world 
history and spatial politics, the concept of ‘supra-state’ is introduced as a 
creative agency to delineate China’s historical potential. Critical of ‘the 
loss of meaning, abstraction of the life-world, and the rationalization of 
unequal relations’ entailed by capitalism, this formulation relies on 
culturalist foundations to articulate a different political vision. The 
Chinese ‘supra-state’, based in a vast, complicated, and boundless 
civilization, begs the ultimate question of how to spatially and 
substantially define ‘China’ and its everyday internal and external 
relations. Answering this question requires a shift in our conception of 
history, so that the BRI can be situated within a civilizational imaginary. 
Given that China has evolved into an intrinsically ‘supracivilization of 
civilizations’ against the singularization or homogenization that breeds 
conflict and oppression, ‘the practice of One Belt One Road can 
reestablish mutually respective social relations in a dynamic process’. It is 
thus a plan of global communicative inter-subjectivity, blending a 
traditional civilization and modern socialism, particularity and 
universality, difference and equality. It is ‘a plan of great harmony that 
differs from capitalism’.32 
 CHINA’S NEW GLOBALISM 19 
Here the leading Chinese scholars have deconstructed the traditionally 
intertwined concepts of socialism and internationalism – even rendering 
the latter conceptually impossible within a discourse of an all-
encompassing civilization that invalidates the international. As such, 
‘class’ is analytically nullified and cannot animate politics. The party 
theory of ‘three represents’ to accommodate the pluralized values of a 
market society proposed in 2001 is to ‘allow the CCP to represent the 
political interests of newly arisen social strata, successfully avoiding the 
crisis of representation that would occur if the party were only to 
represent the interests of workers and peasants’. This observation is 
astounding, coming as it did at the very time when traditional socialist 
conceptions of representing the labouring classes were in devastating 
retreat. The replacement of a classless cultural ‘nation’ as what is to be 
represented by the CCP is grounded in ‘its indigenous, national nature, its 
authentic Chinese nature, rather than in the Party’s class nature’.33 At the 
same time, China’s desire to make a contribution to humanity is believed 
to ‘prove that the great revival of the Chinese people is not nationalistic, 
but cosmopolitan’. Again culturalist in essence, the roots of this 
cosmopolitanism are in Confucian universalist declarations that ‘when the 
Way prevails, tianxia is shared by all’, as well as in the communist belief 
in human emancipation. Displacing internationalism, this conflation of 
Confucianism and communism turns the stigma of empire into an 
advantage. Superseding nations and other societal units, the notion of a 
‘supra-state’ might be compatible with those of the ‘global’, 
‘transnational’, and ‘cosmopolitan’, but not the ‘international’.  
Unexpectedly perhaps, anti-capitalism is then displaced by the struggle 
for global supremacy, and the politico-economic opposition between 
socialism and capitalism is converted into the culturally-based shift of the 
global centre of gravity toward the East, bringing western hegemony to an 
end. In this perspective, any criticism of imperialist or expansionist 
menace is precluded, especially given that no territorial dispute is 
insolvable if ‘shared sovereignty’ and other innovative institutional means 
can be explored. The fact that China is being globalized, and that the 
participating capital in the BRI is no longer limited to Chinese capital, 
does, to say the least, further complicate the issue. 
THE SPECTRE OF SOCIALISM 
Does China have a global grand strategy to achieve socialism? Officially, 
the country is celebrating the 40th anniversary of its initial market reform 
this year. In retrospect, undoubtedly the reforms have been a march 
toward capitalist global integration, rather than a temporary strategic 
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retreat analogous to the New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia nearly a 
century ago. Many see China’s presence as a commanding fact on a 
planetary scale – not just in terms of the betterment of the lives of one 
fifth of the world’s population, but even in the sense that the epoch of 
ruthless capitalist dominion over miserably subjugated peoples seems to 
have come to a close.34 The irony, however, is that the resilience of 
capitalism is nowhere better vindicated than in China’s participation in 
the system. The People’s Republic is losing its original substance and 
distinction along the way, as the growth model it champions becomes 
ever more socially and ecologically indefensible. With the ruling ideology 
(whether in its deformed Marxist or Confucian discourses) as well as 
social consciousness so entrenched in the fetishisms of commodities and 
money, China has remade itself into an unlikely carrier of the torch for 
neoliberal globalization with authoritarian and bureaucratic characteristics.  
The transformation of Communist China from outside challenger to 
dutiful participant in global capitalism marks a world-historical defeat for 
socialism no less significant than the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet, 
these former ‘two great hybrids’ in the process of modernization35 need 
not remain stuck where they have arrived. In particular, the Chinese 
success in capitalist terms means that a reorientation towards reviving 
socialism in China would inevitably affect the whole globe. Socialism, 
after all, is the only assurance of equality against chauvinism and 
expansionism. The theoretical indivisibility of socialism and 
internationalism means practical incompatibility between domestic 
departure from socialism and foreign advance in line with 
internationalism.  
China’s search for its future is wide open. It depends on the 
development of a transformative politics from above, which is not totally 
inconceivable so long as there is a strong impetus for this from below. 
The potential for such a political fusion may be seen in the ongoing 
movements of striking workers and protesting veterans, villagers and 
civic activists, as well as young Marxist reading groups and bloggers 
defying censorship and repression. Any project of reclaiming the party 
and state can critically draw on still active Chinese revolutionary and 
socialist legacies. Only such a project will allow China to take the long 
view, and lead the way in restricting capital, socializing monopolies, and 
de-financializing economic management the world over. Socialism and 
internationalism remain the two indispensable aspects of contemporary 
Chinese ambition whose success will ultimately be measured by 
overcoming capitalism and imperialism. 
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